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FOREIGN POLICY AIMS AND MILITARY REQUIREMENTS
Council on Foreign Relations,
New York, June 4, 1948

I. Aims of Foreign Policy

(a) National Security.

(b) World climate favorable to maximum benefits and contributions.

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Erroneous belief that only first calls for military strength on our part and that that interferes with accomplishment of second.

At moment, these objectives have become completely interwoven and indestinguishable. They must be treated as one and the same. No U.S. security without climate. No chance of achieving climate if U.S. security is jeopardized.

They are not static - but dynamic. Not attainment - but progress toward. We intend and expect to make progress (satisfactory) toward both without using armed force, although we cannot be absolutely sure. But without maintaining armed force, we could make progress toward neither.

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II. Russia

Heart and soul of our policy - restoring of balance in Europe - not balance of power - balance of vitality, hope, confidence.

For this we are waging a war, indeed - but not military war. Only if this war is lost will we have to used armed strength.

Why, then, do we need to maintain armed strength if we are not going to use it?

1. Deterrent. Cite Jay

   Remember that members of Soviet government have sense of obligation to their own movement.

2. Encouragement to friands. Preoccupation of Europeans with military element. Greece. France. The net under the trapeze.

3. Suppose we fail? or suffer accident? Cite Hamilton. Remember weakness more dangerous than strength. No abstractions.

III. This does not answer all our questions.

What form should our defense arrangements take? Demands different.

How should we apportion our resources? to ourselves and others? and to what extent should we submit to others, either individually or collectively,

the power of decision over the time and place and manner in which our forces are to be employed?

On these questions, and on related ones, ladies and gentlemen, no one in the Government is vain enough to believe that he has all the answers. And we are well aware, in Washington, that no answers we think up will be of any great value unless they are founded in the instincts and feelings of the mass of the people throughout the country. There could hardly be a gathering better equipped than yourselves to tell us in Government what those feelings are.

For this reason, it is a real privilege for me to be able to throw these questions open here for general discussion, and I shall be particularly interested myself, in view of my position and duties in Washington, to hear the views expressed.